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This paper presents a simple model with financial frictions 
where inflation increases the cost faced by firms holding 
liquid assets to hedge risky production against expenditure 
shocks. Inflation tilts firms’ technology choice away from 
innovative activities and toward safer but return-dominated 
ones, and therefore reduces long-run growth. The theory 
makes specific predictions about how the severity of this 
adverse effect depends on industry characteristics. These 
predictions are tested with novel harmonized firm-level data 
from 139 developing countries, overcoming small sample 
problems constraining previous work. The analysis finds that 
inflation affects the composition but not the overall quantity 
of investment. A one percentage point increase in inflation 
reduces the establishment-level probability of innovation by 
4.3 percent but does not affect total investment. Moreover, 
innovating firms display a stronger dependence on liquid 
assets, which, in turn, are negatively related to inflation. 
Generalized difference-in-differences estimations corrobo-
rate the sector-specific predictions of the theoretical model.
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1 Introduction
There is now a substantial body of evidence indicating that sustained – and therefore likely
predictable – inflation can have adverse consequences for long-run growth. The theoretical
discussion about the negative consequences of inflation has focused on the opportunity cost
of holding money, distortions of relative prices and of the tax system, and particularly on
the effects on the incentives for investment and saving. However, the empirical support for
these ideas and their relevant implications for economic growth is mixed so that there is still
no consensus about the causal mechanism underlying the relationship between inflation and
growth.
Against this background, our paper makes two contributions. In the first part of the paper,
we present a simple model formalizing the idea of a causal effect of inflation on growth, which
is transmitted not via the level of aggregate investment, but instead via its composition (tech-
nology choice). In the model firms engage in two alternative technologies, basic and advanced.
The advanced technology is innovative and yields higher expected returns, but it is subject to
idiosyncratic expenditure shocks. By contrast, the basic technology is free from idiosyncratic
risk but return-dominated. Firms operating the advanced technology can insure themselves
against idiosyncratic risk by holding a precautionary buffer of readily marketable, liquid assets.
However, the scope for such insurance is constrained by the limited pledgeability of firms’ in-
come from production. As a consequence, liquidity must be comitted ex-ante and hence carries
a liquidity premium. Liquidity provision is therefore costly (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998), and
an increase in the liquidity premium induces firms to economize on its use. Thus, when the
terms of hedging advanced production against expenditure shocks become less favorable, firms
shift their physical investment towards the basic technology, which leads to less innovation and
thereby diminished growth in aggregate productivity and output.
Since the relevant liquidity premium is given by the nominal interest rate, which is linked
to the rate of inflation via the Fisher equation, this mechanism implies that increased inflation
works like a tax on advanced investment and hence reduces innovation and productivity growth.
Moreover, our theory makes predictions about how the severity of this adverse interest rate
effect depends on firm or industry characteristics. Specifically, we show that the above liquidity
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mechanism is particularly relevant in fast growing and volatile industries, and in those with
high income pledgeability. Liquidity demand and investment composition in these industries
are therefore predicted to be more sensitive to variations in the rate of inflation.
In the second part of the paper, we test these predictions with firm-level data. Examining
the microeconomic mechanism and the specific hypotheses of our model requires information
on inflation episodes, firms’ investment in advanced technologies (that is, their innovation
activities), and the sources of finance available to firms for the working capital expenditure
associated with such investment. Empirical work using this information is prone to suffer from
small sample problems since inflation only varies at the country-year level and harmonized
detailed firm-level panel data are typically only available for few countries or years. This
lack of appropriate data has so far limited researchers in studying the impact of inflation on
corporate activity, constraining their ability to scrutinize relevant macroeconomic transmission
mechanisms on the basis of microeconomic data.
We use novel data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) to address this problem.
The WBES provide representative establishment-level data for more than 100,000 establish-
ments that are harmonized across 139 developing countries from 2006-2016. The harmonized
WBES data provide substantial variation in firms’ behavior across countries and time periods
spanning a significant range of inflation, making it possible to empirically identify the relation
between inflation and firms’ innovation and financing activities. The data also include detailed
information on establishments’ innovation activity as well as sources to finance working capital
and are thus well-suited to test the specific microeconomic mechanism underlying our model.
A potential limitation is that the WBES do not provide direct balance sheet information on
firms’ short-term liquidity holdings, which we proxy with the extent of working capital finance
via internal funds or retained earnings. As a robustness check, we therefore extend our analysis
with detailed balance sheet data for U.S. firms from Compustat which include a direct measure
of corporate liquidity holdings and also have meaningful variation in inflation rates over the
period 1960-2016.
On the basis of the WBES data, we find that inflation reduces the probability of product
and process innovation in developing countries but has no effect on total investment. Hence,
inflation influences the quality but not the quantity of investment. The impact of inflation on
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the composition of investment via firms’ technology choice is statistically and economically sig-
nificant: a one percentage point (pp) increase in inflation reduces the probability of innovation
at the establishment level by 4.3%. Consistent with the prediction that firms economize on the
use of liquid assets in periods of increased inflation, we find that inflation reduces the share
of working capital financed by internal funds or retained earnings, but not the share financed
by formal bank loans. Finally, the adverse impact of inflation on innovation increases with
establishments’ reliance on internal funds or retained earnings to finance their working capital.
The Compustat data, which allow for a tighter measurement of corporate liquidity holdings,
further reveal that U.S. firms’ R&D expenditure is increasing with their liquidity holdings: a
1% increase in corporate liquidity holdings is on average associated with a 6% increase in firms’
R&D intensity. Corporate liquidity holdings, in turn, are negatively affected by inflation: a
one pp increase in inflation reduces firms’ liquidity holdings by 5.5%. Hence, the adverse effect
of inflation on the composition of aggregate investment and its transmission via reduced liq-
uidity holdings is corroborated also in the context of an industrialized economy with developed
financial markets.
Finally, the sector-specific predictions of our theoretical model enable us to apply a general-
ized difference-in-difference specification as in Rajan and Zingales (1998), which also helps to
address any remaining endogeneity concerns. We find that the negative impact of inflation on
establishments’ innovation or R&D activity is larger in (i) more volatile sectors, (ii) sectors with
higher value added growth, (iii) more R&D intensive sectors, and (iv) sectors with higher asset
tangibility. There is thus broad support for the specific mechanism laid out in our theoretical
model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 embeds our paper into the related
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 discusses the data, the estimation
strategy and our empirical findings. The final section concludes.
2 Related literature
There is a vast literature studying the effects of inflation on growth. Theoretical models used
to examine the effects of inflation on growth typically combine a variant of an endogenous
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growth model with the assumption that consumption and capital investment are subject to a
cash-in-advance constraint (Stockman, 1981; Abel, 1985). When capital accumulation faces
a cash requirement, the long-term capital-to-labor ratio is decreasing in the nominal interest
rate, which acts as a tax on capital. As a consequence, aggregate investment should decrease
in inflation, but this is not consistent with the empirical evidence. For example, De Gregorio
(1993) finds a significant negative correlation between inflation and growth, whereas the rela-
tionship between inflation and aggregate investment is negative but not significant. Moreover,
cross-country growth regressions reveal that the coefficient of inflation remains virtually un-
changed when controlling for investment. Thus, contrary to the theoretical predictions from
traditional models, the growth effects of inflation appear to unfold independent from aggregate
investment.
Instead, the transmission mechanism from inflation to growth seems to operate via the
‘productivity of investment’. Our model captures this channel in terms of the composition of
aggregate investment, that is, in terms of the choice between a basic and an advanced but
risky technology,1 which can be partially insured via corporate liquidity holdings whose costs
increase with the rate of inflation. Closely related ideas are pursued in Berentsen, Rojas Breu,
and Shi (2012) and Chu and Cozzi (2014). Berentsen, Rojas Breu, and Shi (2012) explore the
link between the opportunity cost of holding cash, R&D investment and growth on the basis
of a money search model where liquidity is essential for trade to take place in the innovation
sector. Similarly, Chu and Cozzi (2014) analyze the effects of inflation on economic growth in a
Schumpeterian model with a cash-in-advance requirement on R&D investment.2 By contrast, in
our model, the cost of inflation does not arise from a simple liquidity requirement but from the
need for firms to keep a precautionary buffer to self-insure their advanced production against
liquidity shocks in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
This connects our modeling approach to the investment composition effect studied in Aghion,
Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2010). Concerned with the relationship between volatility
and growth, these authors decompose aggregate investment in order to examine how credit
1This obviously resonates with ideas from the literature about occupational choice (Banerjee and Newman,
1993).
2Chu and Lai (2013) examine the growth effects of inflation in a quality ladder model with a money-in-utility
specification.
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constraints affect the cyclical behavior of productivity-enhancing investment. In analogy to
the inflation-growth nexus, their cross-country regressions indicate that the observed negative
relation between volatility and growth is independent of aggregate investment.3 However, in the
presence of financial constraints the impact of business-cycle shocks on the share of productivity-
enhancing investment in total private investment is greater for countries facing tighter financial
constraints. Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette, and Eymard (2007) corroborate this idea with
firm-level evidence about the relationship between credit constraints and firms’ R&D activity
over the business cycle. And Aghion, Farhi, and Kharroubi (2012) exploit industry variation
in the prevalence of credit and liquidity constraints to establish that R&D expenditure is more
affected by countercyclical monetary policy than physical investment.
Indeed, R&D expenditure is a natural proxy for productivity-enhancing investment at the
firm-level and, given its limited tangibility, also particularly prone to financial constraints.
Building on these facts, our theoretical model and empirical analysis rest on two key relation-
ships. First, that higher inflation works to reduce corporate liquidity holdings; and second,
that these liquidity holdings play an essential role in shaping the composition of aggregate
investment. The background for most studies of corporate liquidity holdings is the view that
external finance is costly and that firms hold liquid assets in order to survive bad times and to
have funds readily available if investment opportunities arise. These benefits of corporate liq-
uidity must then be balanced against its cost which materializes in terms of a liquidity premium
(Mulligan, 1997). Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) examine the determinants
and implications of holdings of cash and marketable securities by publicly traded non-financial
U.S. firms (1974-1994). They find that (i) firms facing tighter constraints hold a larger share of
their total assets in the form of liquid assets, that (ii) firms with strong growth opportunities
and riskier cash flows hold particularly high ratios of cash to total non-cash assets,4 and that
(iii) cash holdings increase with the firms’ R&D-to-sales ratio. Moreover, there is evidence
that firms build cash buffers mainly from retained earnings and that these reserves are gener-
ally not used for planned activities (capital expenditures, acquisition spending or payouts to
3Similar findings are obtained by Fischer (1993), Cukierman, Kalaitzidakis, Summers, and Webb (1993),
Ramey and Ramey (1995), Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Easterly (2005).
4We see these features – high growth potential and risky cash flow – as the defining characteristics of the
advanced technology in our model. The importance of growth opportunities is also emphasized in Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004).
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shareholders) but instead depleted by (unexpected) operating losses. That is, there is a pre-
cautionary motive for holding corporate liquidity to provide insurance against expenditure risk.
More recently, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) document that the average cash-to-assets ratio
for U.S. industrial firms has more than doubled between 1980 and 2006 and argue that this
increase in cash holdings can be traced back to changing firm characteristics, in particular more
risky cash flows and increasing R&D intensity. More broadly, the empirical corporate finance
literature provides ample evidence that innovations and R&D are cash-intensive, and that liq-
uidity requirements are more important than for physical investment.5 On the other hand,
the relationship between inflation and corporate liquidity holdings has received less attention
by the empirical literature. Our paper thus contributes to the macroeconomic literature on
inflation and growth with systematic firm-level evidence concerning both the relation between
inflation and corporate liquidity and the mechanism tying liquidity holdings to the composition
of investment.
3 A simple model
In the following, we develop a simple model illustrating the causal transmission mechanism from
inflation to firms’ decisions about liquidity holdings and technology adoption.6 The model is
partial equilibrium in nature and takes inflation as exogenously given. The Fisher equation
then relates the nominal interest rate to the (expected) rate of inflation pi,
1 +R = β−1(1 + pi), (1)
where β−1 measures the gross real interest rate, which we normalize to one. More generally,
interest rates and inflation are endogenously determined in the general equilibrium of a fully-
dynamic, monetary economy nesting the environment laid out below. However, the details
5The literature uncovers a significant relationship between R&D expenditure and either cash flow or corporate
liquidity (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Brown and Petersen, 2011; He and Wintoki, 2016), and that this
relationship is more robust and pronounced than for physical investment (Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009;
Brown and Petersen, 2009). Moreover, firms tend to smooth R&D expenditure by maintaining a buffer stock
of liquidity in the form of cash reserves (Brown, Martinsson, and Petersen, 2012).
6The model’s underlying structure shares some similarities with Brutti (2011), but it has a quite different
focus and introduces ex-ante heterogeneity and technology choice.
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of this nesting model are not essential for our key argument that liquidity provision is costly
and priced by the relevant scarcity indicator for nominal funds, that is, the nominal interest
rate. In essence, the distortion at work in our model is akin to that arising from a cash-in-
advance constraint: Self-insurance for entrepreneurs is possible only via liquid assets. Given
their exclusive role, these assets therefore carry a liquidity premium, captured by the fact that
liquid assets held by entrepreneurs do not pay interest. Just like in the presence of a cash-in-
advance constraint, the nominal interest rate thus distorts the allocation in an otherwise real
economy. In view of the generality of this mechanism, it plays out in a variety of nesting model
environments.7 We therefore suppress this supporting structure and instead go on to describe
the liquidity problem for our simple model. Notice that this is also in line with our empirical
approach, which analyzes disaggregate data to examine the firm-level consequences of inflation.
3.1 Economic environment
Consider an economy that lasts for three periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and is populated by a continuum
of entrepreneurs and a financial intermediary, both of them risk neutral. For simplicity, there
is no discounting. The rate of inflation between date 0 and date 2 is given by pi. The financial
intermediary has deep pockets and can lend at an opportunity cost equal to the nominal interest
rate R. This nominal interest rate is pinned down by the Fisher equation, that is, R = pi.
Entrepreneurs have no endowment but access to two alternative investment technologies, called
basic and advanced. The two technologies are alternative means to produce a single homogenous
good and are based on potentially risky investment projects, one per entrepreneur. At date 0,
entrepreneurs must choose which technology to operate.
The basic technology is riskless.8 Investment into a basic project costs one unit in t = 0 and
yields a nominal return of (1 + pi)B in t = 2. Expressed in date 0 units, the basic technology’s
real return is thus B. We assume B > 1, so date 0 investment is profitable.
7In an earlier working paper version of this paper (Evers, Niemann, and Schiffbauer, 2007), we describe a
complete model embedding a contracting problem about scarce liquidity into a dynamic monetary framework
with an explicit endogenous growth mechanism. Fully-developed general equilibrium environments are also
considered in Berentsen, Rojas Breu, and Shi (2012) and Chu and Cozzi (2014).
8The key difference between basic and advanced projects is that the former are free from idiosyncratic risk,
while the latter are not. The model can be easily generalized to include also aggregate risk, which, however,
plays no essential role as long as it affects both technologies symmetrically. We therefore abstract from aggregate
risk in order to illustrate the economic mechanism in the simplest possible environment.
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The advanced technology is subject to idiosyncratic risk. Investment into advanced project
j costs one unit in t = 0 and yields a nominal return of (1 + pi)αj in t = 2. Expressed in
date 0 units, the advanced technology’s return thus is αj, where αj denotes the idiosyncratic
shock realized in t = 1. The idiosyncratic shock αj is private information and takes values
αj = Aj > 0 with probability ωl (lucky) and α
j = 0 with probability ωu = 1 − ωl (unlucky).
Unlucky projects admit an additional investment with variable size i which returns ρi in t = 2,
both expressed in real terms. Assuming ωlA
j > 1 for all j and ρ > 1 ensures both date 0
investment and date 1 reinvestment are profitable. Notice, however, that the idiosyncratic
expenditure shock αj introduces an element of ex-ante heterogeneity across advanced projects.
This heterogeneity will be seen to drive the entrepreneurial choice between the basic and the
advanced technology.
Regardless of which technology they operate, entrepreneurs have limited access to credit.
Specifically, we assume entrepreneurs can pledge only a fraction γ < 1 of their project’s expected
revenues. Moreover, we make the following assumption on model parameters.
Assumption 1. Assume γB > 1, γωlA
j > 1 for all j and γρ < 1.
Accordingly, date 0 lending is profitable for the financial intermediary, but date 1 lending, which
is relevant only for advanced projects, is not. The advanced technology is therefore associated
with a demand for liquidity in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998): Unlucky advanced
entrepreneurs cannot borrow on the spot market to finance additional investment. Instead,
liquidity must be committed already at the initial investment stage (date 0). Moreover, also
contingent contracts with the financial intermediary are not available since the idiosyncratic
expenditure shock is private information.9 The limited pledgeability of income and the un-
availability of contingent financial contracts together imply that advanced entrepreneurs need
to precaution for their date 1 investment needs, and they can do so only by saving a buffer
stock of liquid funds. This liquidity must be obtained at date 0 from the financial intermediary
who refinances at cost R.10
9A contingent contract would stipulate a positive transfer in the case of an adverse expenditure shock and
a negative transfer in the alternative case. For details, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
10Since the idiosyncratic expenditure shocks are private information, there is no scope for liquidity pooling
via the financial intermediary.
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3.2 Equilibrium
At date t = 0, entrepreneurs face the choice between the two alternative technologies. If
entrepreneur j operates the basic technology, she borrows an amount bj from the financial
intermediary to finance her initial unit investment subject to the date 0 borrowing constraint
(1 +R)bj ≤ γ(1 + pi)B, or in real terms,
bj ≤ γB. (2)
Given our assumption that γB > 1, the borrowing constraint is not binding and bj = 1.
Nominal income from the basic technology net of borrowing costs then is (1 +pi)B− (1 +R)bj,
or in real terms,
yjbasic = B − 1. (3)
If entrepreneur j instead operates the advanced technology, she borrows an amount dj from
the financial intermediary to finance her initial unit investment and her liquidity holdings lj
used to self-insure against subsequent expenditure shocks. This is done so as to maximize the
expected profit (1 + pi)
[
ωly
j
l + (1− ωl)yju
]− (1 +R)dj, or in real terms,
Eyjadvanced =
[
ωly
j
l + (1− ωl)yju
]− dj, (4)
where
yjl = A
j +
lj
(1 +R)
, (5)
yju = ρ
lj
(1 +R)
. (6)
These expressions make the costs of holding liquidity for self-insurance evident. Liquidity must
be obtained at cost (1 + R) at date 0 and then kept until date 1 when the expenditure shock
materializes. The real return to a unit of idle liquidity is thus given by 1/(1 +R). Notice also
that expression (6) implicitly imposes that, on date 1, unlucky entrepreneurs fully reinvest into
their project, that is, ij = lj/(1 + R). This is without loss of generality since reinvestment at
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date 1 has strictly positive returns. The date 0 budget constraint facing entrepreneur j is
1 + lj = dj, (7)
whereby the limited pledgeability of revenues from production constrains date 0 borrowing to
(1 +R)dj ≤ γ(1 + pi) [ωlyjl + (1− ωl)yju], or in real terms,
dj ≤ γ [ωlyjl + (1− ωl)yju] . (8)
Maximizing (4) subject to (7) and (8) yields a corner solution where the borrowing constraint
is binding, provided the expected return on liquidity held by the entrepreneur is higher than
the cost of borrowing. We assume this condition to be satisfied.
Assumption 2. Assume ρ¯ ≡ [ωl + (1− ωl)ρ] > (1 +R).
The entrepreneur’s date 0 borrowing and savings then satisfy
dj = γ
(
ωlA
j + ρ¯
lj
(1 +R)
)
(9)
and
lj =
γωlA
j − 1
1− γρ¯ 1
(1+R)
=
(1 +R)(γωlA
j − 1)
(1 +R)− γρ¯ . (10)
Given the cost of self-insurance, the liquidity demand of entrepreneur j is decreasing in the
nominal interest rate, ∂l
j
∂(1+R)
< 0.11 Substituting (10) back into (4), expected income from the
advanced technology is
Eyjadvanced =
[
ωly
j
l + (1− ωl)yju
]− dj = (1− γ)(1 +R)ωlAj − ρ¯
(1 +R)− γρ¯ . (11)
Importantly, given that the scope for self-insurance via liquidity holdings is distorted by the
nominal interest rate, also the expected income from the advanced technology is decreasing in
the nominal interest rate. This is because higher interest rates induce entrepreneurs to hold
11Formally, ∂l
j
∂(1+R) < 0 as, by Assumption 1, γωlA
j > 1.
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less liquidity, which, in turn, reduces the date 1 reinvestment following an expenditure shock.
Comparing (3) and (11), entrepreneur j adopts the advanced technology if Eyjadvanced ≥ yjbasic,
or equivalently,
Aj ≥ 1
ωl
(B−1)
(1−γ) [(1 +R)− γρ¯] + ρ¯
(1 +R)
. (12)
Hence, entrepreneurs whose upside risk Aj of operating an advanced project is sufficiently
strong self-select into the advanced technology. By contrast, those with lower Aj prefer the
basic technology. Condition (12) therefore defines the threshold level for Aj in terms of model
parameters and the exogenous interest rate R. The right-hand side of condition (12) is increas-
ing in the nominal interest rate.12 That is, in environments with higher inflation and nominal
interest rates there are tighter conditions for adopting the advanced over the basic technology.
3.3 Empirical predictions
Since the income from the basic technology yjbasic is invariant to variations in parameters other
than B, it follows that the inequality condition (12) for adoption of the advanced technology
is driven by variations in the expected income from the advanced technology Eyjadvanced given
by equation (11). Based on the comparative statics for Eyjadvanced, we obtain the following
empirical predictions.
Proposition 1. In the economy under consideration, there is an adverse interest rate effect:
(i) An increase in the nominal interest rate makes the advanced technology less attractive,
∂Eyjadvanced
∂(1 +R)
< 0,
and will therefore tilt the composition of investment towards the basic technology.
(ii) Keeping the expected return ρ¯ ≡ [ωl+(1−ωl)ρ] on liquidity fixed, the adverse interest rate
effect is more pronounced for entrepreneurs whose advanced projects have more upside
12Formally, this result obtains as, by Assumption 1, γB > 1.
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potential ωlA
j,
∂2Eyjadvanced
∂(1 +R)∂ωlAj
< 0.
(iii) Keeping upside potential ωlA
j fixed, the adverse interest rate effect is more pronounced for
entrepreneurs whose advanced projects are more risky in the sense of a mean-preserving
spread via an increase in Aj and a decrease in ωl such that ρ¯ ≡ [ωl + (1−ωl)ρ] increases,
∂2Eyjadvanced
∂(1 +R)∂ρ¯
< 0.
(iv) The adverse interest rate effect is more pronounced for entrepreneurs with higher pledge-
able income γ,
∂2Eyjadvanced
∂(1 +R)∂γ
< 0.
The intuition behind the adverse interest rate effect established in part (i) of Proposition
1 is straightforward. Unlike the basic technology, the advanced technology is subject to id-
iosyncratic risk, which can be partially insured through a liquidity buffer. However, holding
liquidity is subject to an opportunity cost given by the nominal interest rate. Higher interest
rates therefore decrease the demand for liquidity,13 and in consequence also the relative at-
tractiveness of advanced projects. Hence, condition (12) becomes tighter, and the composition
of investment is tilted towards the basic technology. That is, the adverse interest rate effect
manifests in terms of an investment composition effect.
The following three parts of Proposition 1 establish that the relative attractiveness of ad-
vanced projects is more sensitive to variations in the nominal interest rate when they are poten-
tially more profitable (part (ii)), more volatile (part (iii)), or characterized by higher pledgeable
income (part (iv)). The underlying mechanism rests on the fact that higher expected profitabil-
ity ωlA
j or higher pledgeable income γ allows for a higher debt capacity, see (8). Given the unit
investment scale, an increasing share of the initial debt is held as liquidity, see (7).14 The role of
13Appendix A.1 formally derives the comparative static effects on the demand for liquidity in (10).
14The model can be generalized to allow for variable investment scale at date 0. Given the linear specification
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liquidity for self-insurance and its dependence on the interest rate are thus more relevant when
the advanced technology is more profitable or pledgeable. The same logic also applies when
the advanced technology is more risky. This is because the mean-preserving spread described
in part (iii) works to increase the expected return to liquidity ρ¯ ≡ [ωl + (1− ωl)ρ].
Notice that parts (ii) to (iv) above also allow a direct interpretation in terms of empirically
observed outcomes. Industries where ωlA
j, ρ¯ or γ is higher will be more exposed to the advanced
technology. This technology allows for higher expected returns, but is also more volatile due
to the presence of idiosyncratic liquidity risk. The empirical hypothesis therefore is that the
liquidity mechanism should be particularly relevant in fast growing and volatile industries, and
in those with high income pledgeability.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we use firm-level panel data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES)
to examine the model’s key predictions regarding the effects of inflation on corporate innovation
and financing activity. To that end, the WBES are particularly useful as they provide harmo-
nized cross-country data for a large number of developing countries with significant variation
in inflation.
4.1 Data
World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The WBES are designed to provide internationally
comparable establishment-level data for a large number of developing countries that are rep-
resentative for the formal private sector economy (that is, establishments with at least five
employees) for each country-year episode. They include information on innovation activities,
sources of finance, and other key characteristics for over 100,000 establishments in 139 develop-
ing countries between 2006 and 2016. The harmonized surveys are conducted about every three
years in each country. The surveys provide sampling weights for each country-year episode so
that the weighted estimations are representative at the country level. Appendix A.3 provides
of technology, the analysis is then per unit of initial investment, with unchanged comparative statics.
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additional details on the survey design and sampling.15
The harmonized WBES data capture substantial variation in firms’ behavior across countries
and time periods spanning a significant range of financial development and inflation, making
it possible to empirically identify the relation between inflation and firms’ innovation and
financing activities. The data are thus well-suited to test the specific microeconomic mechanism
underlying our model (cf. Proposition 1).
We proxy firms’ investment in advanced technologies with their innovation activity. The
surveys distinguish between different dimensions of innovation, that is, between product and
process innovation. Both are relevant for our analysis as they are expected to be more risky than
conventional investments and to increase future productivity, and ultimately growth. We thus
define three variables to measure innovation, indicating whether an establishment introduced
a new product, a new production process, or both. Specifically, innovation is measured by a
dummy variable equal to one if the establishment either introduced a new product or a new
production process in the last three years and zero if not; analogous variables are defined for
product and process innovation, separately.
The surveys also provide information on establishments’ sources of finance for their working
capital expenditure. This is relevant since the idiosyncratic shock associated with the advanced
technology (e.g., an unexpected cost overrun when introducing a new product or process) is
captured as part of establishments’ working capital expenditure, which is financed via corporate
liquidity in the form of internal funds or retained earnings. Specifically, we exploit the following
survey question:
- Over the last fiscal year, please estimate the proportion of this establishment’s working
capital that was financed from each of the following sources? Internal funds/Retained
earnings; Banks; Other.16
The dependence on internal funds/retained earnings to finance working capital expenditure can
be regarded as a close counterpart to the requirement of using corporate liquidity holdings to
meet unforseen expenditure needs associated with the advanced technology formulated in our
15The harmonized WBES data for all countries are available online at https://www.enterprisesurveys.
org/portal/index.aspx\#/library?dataset=Combined.
16The category ‘other’ financing sources includes non-bank financial institutions, supplier and customer credit,
friends and relatives.
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model. By contrast, bank finance is less likely to be available for this purpose due to the limited
pledgeability of income and the non-contingent nature of debt contracts for risky investment,
especially in developing countries where financial markets are less developed. We thus expect
that establishments that have a higher share of retained earnings in financing their working
capital are more likely to innovate.17
Moreover, we use total investment to examine the impact of inflation and corporate liquidity
holdings on establishments’ overall investment. We also include the following establishment-
level control variables: Establishment size, measured by the log of the number of employees;
the establishments’ age; a dummy variable indicating if it is a subsidiary of a larger firm having
access to intra-firm credit; and a dummy variable indicating if it has any formal bank loan
(that is, different from credit lines for working capital).
Other data sources. We measure inflation by consumer price inflation from the World Bank
World Development Indicators (WDI) for all countries and years included in the WBES.18 We
remove inflation outliers by excluding country-year observation with excessive rates above 100%
as well as significant deflation episodes with rates below -2% since firms’ incentives to adjust
their investment behavior might be driven by different factors during these extreme episodes.
Qualitatively, our results remain unchanged if we do not impose any range for inflation or use
alternative restrictions (only including inflation episodes above 0% and below 20% or 50%).
The average (median) inflation rate in the WBES sample is 7% (5.8%). We also use real
GDP per capita in constant US dollars from the WDI as a macro-level control variable. Our
empirical specification works with the first lag of both inflation and real GDP per capita since
the variables from the WBES refer to the previous year.
Moreover, we use two-digit sector-level information to test the ‘difference-in-difference’ pre-
dictions (ii)-(iv) in Proposition 1. Specifically, the sector variables allow us to examine whether
the adverse effect of inflation on innovation is more pronounced in more productive sectors, in
17While there are several potential financing sources for working capital, we show (cf. Table 1 below) that
retained earnings are the predominant form. By contrast, formal bank loans are available only to relatively few
firms, and their share in working capital finance is minor.
18Data on consumer price inflation are available for all countries and time periods. Alternative measures for
the cost of liquidity such as nominal deposit or lending interest rates are available only for about two-thirds of
the country-year pairs. Where available, however, these interest rates are highly correlated with our inflation
measure.
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more volatile sectors, in sectors with a higher R&D intensity, and in sectors with a lower ca-
pacity to pledge collateral for external financing. Importantly, these sector-specific predictions
permit a generalized difference-in-difference specification as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) to
address any remaining endogeneity concerns.
We identify firms whose projects have more upside potential in the sense of hypothesis (ii) of
Proposition 1 through their economic activity in the U.S., which serves as a benchmark country.
This is done by computing the average value added growth across two-digit ISIC Rev 3.1 sec-
tors for all years in the UNIDO (2017) Industrial Statistics Database and, alternatively, by the
average R&D intensity of two-digit sectors provided by Samaniego and Sun (2016). Similarly,
we record the volatility of economic activity as measured by the standard deviation of value
added in two-digit ISIC Rev 3.1 sectors for all years in UNIDO (2017) to identify more risky
projects as in hypothesis (iii) of Proposition 1. Finally, we approximate the pledgeable income
of entrepreneurs as in hypothesis (iv) of Proposition 1 by the industry-level asset tangibility
taken from Samaniego and Sun (2016), which is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total
assets. That is, firms in sectors with higher asset tangibility can pledge more collateral and
thus have better access to external finance.
Descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics, summarized in Table 1 show that about
half (53%) of all formal establishments in developing countries engage in some form of in-
novation activity; 39% introduced a product which was new to the firms’ main market, and
43% introduced a new production process. But only relatively few establishments (35%) have
access to formal bank loans. Similarly, the share of bank finance for firms’ working capital
expenditure amounts to only 13%. Instead, the predominant form of working capital finance
is internal funds/retained earnings; their share accounts for 72%. Moreover, about half (46%)
of the establishments report internal funds/retained earnings as their only source of working
capital financing, and for 78% they are the primary source (financing more than half of their
working capital expenditure). These statistics are consistent with the view that investment in
innovation is largely intangible and risky; the associated working capital expenditure is there-
fore difficult to finance externally and must be covered by corporate liquidity holdings in the
form of internal funds/retained earnings.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Observations mean s.d. min max
WBES and WDI:
Innovation 79,608 .529 .499 0 1
New product 79,379 .392 .488 0 1
New process 77,742 .434 .496 0 1
loan 125,992 .349 .477 0 1
share retained earnings in WC 114,174 .718 .339 0 1
share bank finance in WC 114,174 .126 .240 0 1
share other finance in WC 114,174 .149 .255 0 1
share of firms for which retained earnings 114,174 .461 0 .461 .461
is the only source of WC finance
share of firms for which retained earnings 114,174 .775 0 .775 .775
exceed half of their WC finance
ln(inv) 48,660 13.8 3.32 0 29.0
ln(empl) 130,089 3.25 1.39 0 11.1
ln(age) 129,046 3.01 .570 0 5.89
subsidiary 127,496 .178 .383 0 1
inflation 129,309 7.02% 68.3 -2% 100%
ln(real GDP pc) 133,141 7.93 1.05 5.25 10.9
4.2 Empirical specification
The data allow us to examine the key relationships in the mechanism linking inflation to
technology choice and to test the specific predictions in Proposition 1. In detail, we test the
two key components of the model mechanism: First, that firms reduce their liquidity holdings
in periods of higher inflation, ∂l
j
∂(1+R)
< 0; and second, that firms reduce their investment in
innovation activities in periods of higher inflation (part (i) in Proposition 1).
We consider empirical specifications of the form
yjsct = β0 + β1inflct + β2Xjsct + β3Xct + Is + Ic + jsct, (13)
where yjsct is either given by the innovation dummies or by the share of working capital financing
through retained earnings, bank credit, and other sources for firm j in sector s, country c, and
year t. inflct measures the level of inflation firm j faces in country c and year t. Xjsct is
the matrix of firm-level control variables, Xct the vector of macro-level control variables (real
GDP per capita), Is is a vector of two-digit sector fixed effects, Ic is a vector of country fixed
effects, and jsct an independent and identically distributed error.
19 We always cluster the error
19Note that we cannot include establishment fixed effects since the panel dimension of the WBES data is not
representative at the aggregate level. But the cross-section of establishments is representative for the formal
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terms at the country-year level so that the standard errors are robust to within-group (serial)
correlation.20
The mix of macro- and microeconomic data allows to examine causality. Specifically, we can
exclude the possibility of reverse causality since the innovation decision of a single firm has no
significant feedback effect on the aggregate level of inflation. It may of course still be possible
that inflation correlates with other country-level variables that influence an establishment’s
investment decision. For this reason, we include the following control variables. First, we
include country fixed effects to control for any time-invariant aggregate factors that may be
correlated with inflation and firms’ incentives to innovate such as countries’ level of institutional
and financial development (these move slowly over time and are hence considered quasi-fixed
for the WBES time horizon). We thus measure the impact of the within-country variation in
inflation. Second, we control for establishment-level variables and sector fixed effects to control
for firm characteristics that may be correlated with their innovation decision and aggregate
inflation. Third, we control for variation in countries’ economy activities over time.
When the dependent variable is an innovation dummy, we estimate (13) using a probit
regression. The main coefficient of interest (β1) measures the impact of the within-country
variation in inflation on the average innovation activity of establishments operating in the same
two-digit sector within this country, after controlling for changes in the establishment-specific
control variables as well as for changes in the country’s aggregate economic activity. That is, β1
measures the effect of a change in a country’s inflation rate on the establishment’s innovation
activity in that country. To estimate the impact of inflation on establishments’ financing
sources for their working capital, we use a quasi maximum likelihood fractional multinomial
logit estimator (fmlogit), which is efficient if the dependent variable ranges between zero and
one and consists of multiple shares which add up to one for each observation (Papke and
Wooldridge, 1996). The excluded category is given by ‘other’ financing sources.
To test the model-specific predictions (ii)-(iv) in Proposition 1, we additionally consider
private sector in each country and year so that controlling for country fixed effects implies that we measure to
what extent establishments within a given country adjust their innovation activity, on average, if the inflation
rate in that country changes over time.
20Our standard errors are thus not subject to the Moulton (1990) critique in situations where the dependent
variable is less aggregated (firm-level) than the independent one (country-year-level).
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empirical specifications of the form
yjsct = β0 + β1inflct ∗ sectorvars + β2Xjsct + Is + Ict + jsct, (14)
where sectorvars denotes either average value added growth, value added volatility, R&D inten-
sity, or asset tangibility of sector s. Ict are country∗year fixed effects, which control for changes
in any time-varying country-level factors (including countries’ levels of inflation, real GDP per
capita, financial development, etc.) and thus reduce the empirical identification exclusively to
the variation across sectors in the impact of inflation on innovation.21
The coefficient of interest (β1) is the interaction term between inflation and the relevant
sector-specific attribute. The interaction term reflects the idea that, ceteris paribus, the in-
novation activity in establishments within a sector that is, for instance, more R&D intensive
should be more sensitive to variations in inflation than the activity of establishments in sectors
that rely less on R&D. Equation (14) is thus a generalized difference-in-difference specification
following the strategy of Rajan and Zingales (1998). It tests whether the sector-level effects
of inflation on innovation activity are in line with our theoretical predictions, controlling for
time-varying establishment-level control variables and for fixed and time-varying unobserved
country characteristics. Apart from testing the model-specific hypotheses (ii)-(iv) in Proposi-
tion 1, (14) thus also provides a test for causality of the impact of inflation on establishments’
innovation activity.
4.3 Empirical results
The first two columns of Table 2 show that inflation reduces the share of working capital fi-
nanced by retained earnings relative to ‘other’ financing sources (supplier and customer credit,
informal sources), but not the share financed by banks. That is, a one percentage point (pp)
higher inflation reduces the share of working capital financed by retained earnings by 3.7 pp.
Moreover, bank finance is more important for large firms and those that are subsidiaries of
larger conglomerates. The results are consistent with our model prediction that, in periods
21Note that the inclusion of country ∗ year fixed effects also captures the level effect of inflation in 14 and
thus cannot be included in 13. The sector fixed effects, in turn, capture the level effects of our sector-specific
variables such as sectors’ R&D intensity.
20
of higher inflation, firms reduce their holdings of liquid assets to finance unexpected working
capital expenditure (see equation (10)). Column 3 of Table 2 shows that the probability for
Table 2: Harmonized firm panel for 139 countries from 2006-16:
Inflation reduces firms’ liquidity holdings and innovation
Retained Bank Innovation New New ln(Inv)
earnings finance product process
fmlogit probit (marginals) ols
inflation -.037∗∗ .005 -.043∗∗ -.029∗∗ -.030∗∗ .005
(-3.53) (0.35) (-3.52) (-2.22) (-3.19) (0.25)
ln(empl) -.041 .202∗∗ .061∗∗ .044∗∗ .062∗∗ .726∗∗
(-1.46) (7.61) (12.6) (13.1) (9.01) (14.7)
ln(age) .014 .040 -.031∗∗ -.028∗∗ -.043∗∗ -.087
(0.21) (.54) (-3.12) (-3.29) (-2.93) (-1.01)
subsidiary .093 .251∗ .108∗∗ .111∗∗ .081∗∗ .342∗∗
(0.68) (1.81) (3.49) (3.49) (4.84 (3.88)
ln(real GDP pc) -1.60∗∗ -.182 -.625∗∗ -.529∗∗ -.969∗∗ -3.23
(-2.74) (-0.26) (-3.44) (-3.08) (-4.43) (-1.57)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms 103,050 103,050 72,643 72,451 70,909 41,155
World Bank Enterprise Surveys establishment-level data in 139 developing countries
from 2006-16. Marginal effects are reported for the Probit estimations. Median
inflation: 6%. Heteroscedasticity robust s.e. clustered at country∗year
level; t-statistics in parenthesis. **,* significant at 5%, 10%.
establishments in a given country to engage in innovation activities is reduced during episodes
of higher inflation. Higher inflation diminishes the probability of both product and process
innovation (columns 4-5). The corresponding coefficients are significant at the 5% level. By
contrast, inflation has no effect on total investment (column 6), implying that inflation influ-
ences the composition but not the overall volume of investment.
The results thus suggest that inflation shifts establishments’ technology choice from advanced
to basic processes/products that are less exposed to liquidity risk, confirming hypothesis (i) of
Proposition 1 in the model. The marginal effects reported in column 3 of Table 2 imply that
a 1 pp increase in inflation reduces the innovation probability by 4.3%. The adverse impact of
inflation on firms’ technology choice is thus statistically and economically significant.
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In Table 3, we analyze how the adverse effect of inflation on innovation depends on estab-
lishments’ access to external finance. First, we find that inflation reduces innovation also when
Table 3: Harmonized firm panel for 139 countries from 2006-16:
Adverse effects of inflation depend on firms’ access to finance
Innovation
RE=100% RE>50% RE<50% RE<5%
inflation -.041∗∗ -.041∗∗ -.046∗∗ -.044∗∗ -.024∗∗ -.019∗∗
(-3.67) (-3.56) (-5.34) (-3.86) (-2.07) (-2.02)
loan .134∗∗ .156∗∗ .102∗∗ .132∗∗ .109∗∗ .096∗∗
(5.44) (5.96) (4.37) (5.27) (2.89) (2.03)
infl∗loan -.005∗∗
(-1.98)
ln(empl) .051∗∗ .051∗∗ .054∗∗ .051∗∗ .050∗∗ .018
(16.2) (16.9) (15.4) (13.4) (6.80) (1.04)
ln(age) -.033∗∗ -.032∗∗ -.038∗∗ -.031∗∗ -.031 .023
(-3.58) (-3.54) (-3.07) (-2.01) (-1.00) (0.64)
subsidiary .095∗∗ .094∗∗ .102∗∗ .100∗∗ .082∗∗ .013
(3.00) (3.02) (3.05) (3.29) (2.18) (0.20)
ln(real GDP pc) -.663∗∗ -.666∗∗ -.398∗∗ -.570∗∗ -.739∗∗ -.046
(-3.87) (-3.83) (-2.47) (-3.66) (-3.21) (-1.64)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms 70,499 70,499 33,193 54,826 15,656 4,900
World Bank Enterprise Surveys establishment-level data for 139 developing
countries from 2006-16; marginal effects reported. ”RE>50”: Share of working
capital financed through retained earnings larger than 50%. Heteroscedasticity
robust s.e. clustered at country∗year level; t-statistics in parenthesis.
**,* significant at 5%, 10%.
firms have access to formal bank loans. Access to bank loans – in general, not necessarily
for financing working capital expenditure – has a positive direct effect on the probability that
establishments innovate (column 1). However, the negative effect of inflation on innovation
is stronger for those establishments that have access to a formal bank loan (column 2). This
is intuitive since these establishments are more likely to innovate and thus more exposed to
the associated expenditure shocks which need to be need to be precautioned against with a
buffer of liquid assets whose opportunity cost increases with inflation. The relevant effects are
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sizeable. We find that a 1 pp increase in inflation reduces the probability that establishments
without access to a formal bank loan innovate by 4.1%; having access to a formal bank loan
reduces this probability by an additional 0.5 pp (to 4.6%).
A more direct test of our model predictions is possible by examining the importance of
retained earnings for working capital finance (columns 3-6). We find that the adverse impact of
inflation on innovation increases with establishments’ reliance on retained earnings to finance
their working capital. For establishments that finance less than half of their working capital
expenditure through retained earnings (column 5), a 1 pp increase in inflation reduces the
probability to innovate by 2.4%. Recall, however, that the majority of firms do not have
(sufficient) access to formal bank loans for financing their working capital expenditure and
thus need to rely on internal funds or retained earnings. Among the establishments for whom
retained earnings are the main source of working capital finance (78% of the sample, column 4),
the adverse effect of inflation on innovation increases to 4.4%. And for the establishments that
rely exclusively on retained earnings (47% of the sample, column 3), the innovation probability
is reduced by 4.6%.
Table 4 provides the results of the generalized difference-in-difference estimation following
the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998). We test for the causal impact of inflation on
innovation, exploiting variation in industry characteristics. The results confirm all four model
predictions and address any remaining concerns about the endogeneity of country-level inflation
for establishments’ innovation decision. In line with Proposition 1, we find that the impact of
inflation on establishments’ innovation decision is larger in (i) more volatile sectors, (ii) sectors
with higher value added growth, (iii) more R&D intensive sectors, and (iv) sectors with higher
asset tangibility. The common ground here is that these sectors are more exposed to advanced
but risky technologies so that the liquidity mechanism becomes particularly relevant.
4.4 Robustness
While the WBES include detailed information on firms’ sources for financing their working
capital expenditure, it does not provide direct balance sheet information on their short-term
liquidity holdings. Balance sheet information on corporate holdings of cash and cash equivalents
is, however, necessary to directly test the second key component of the model mechanism,
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Table 4: Harmonized firm panel for 139 countries from 2006-16:
Sector-specific identification of inflation effects on innovation
Innovation
sector volatility sector growth sector R&D intensity sector fixed-assets
inflation ∗ sector-volatility -.001∗∗
(-2.14)
inflation ∗ sector-growth -.090∗∗
(-3.68)
inflation ∗ sector-R&D -.004∗
(-1.72)
inflation ∗ sector-fix-asset -.002∗∗
(-2.06)
loan .133∗∗ .132∗∗ .132∗∗ .133∗∗
(11.3) (11.4) (11.7) (11.8)
ln(empl) .046∗∗ .046∗∗ .062∗∗ .046∗∗
(10.9) (11.0) (11.2) (11.5)
ln(age) -.024 -.024 -.024 -.024
(-1.06) (-1.08) (-1.09) (-1.12)
subsidiary .090∗∗ .088∗∗ .089∗∗ .089∗∗
(3.11) (3.10) (3.10) (3.11)
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country∗Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firms 44,842 44,842 44,721 44,721
World Bank Enterprise Surveys establishment-level data for 139 developing countries from 2006-16;
marginal effects reported. Heteroscedasticity robust s.e. clustered at country∗year level;
t-statistics in parenthesis. **,* significant at 5%, 10%.
namely that firms that innovate hold more liquid assets to insure against the associated risk
(see equation (10)).
To the best of our knowledge, reliable balance sheet information on corporate liquidity
holdings is not available for developing countries. We thus complement our analysis of the
WBES with balance sheet data for U.S. firms from Compustat. The data provide information
about cash holdings, the direct counterpart to the concept of corporate liquidity in our model.
The Compustat data are also well suited for our analysis since they have the longest available
time period for a panel of firms for a single country, providing sufficient variation in inflation
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over time; they include all sectors of the U.S. economy from 1960-2016. The data further
serve to test the empirical relevance of our mechanism for an industrialized economy with more
developed financial markets.22
The Compustat sample is based on publicly traded firms. While these are relatively few
compared to the total number of firms, they include the largest firms in the U.S. economy. In
fact, the data account for one-third of total U.S. employment and about 41% of total U.S. sales
(De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). While detailed measures of innovation in terms of technology
choice (product and processs innovation) are not available, Compustat allows to measure the
intensive margin of firms’ innovation activity: we proxy firms’ exposure to the risky advanced
technology by their R&D intensity as measured by R&D expenses relative to total assets. We
also use firms’ total investment and balance sheet information on cash holdings as discussed
earlier. Further, we include the stock of total assets and retained earnings as firm-level control
variables.
The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 5. The average (median) inflation rate in
the sample is 3.6% (3.0%); and firms’ average (median) share of R&D in total assets amounts
to 26% (5%). Importantly, the data reveal that even in countries with relatively developed
financial markets such as the U.S. firms hold a large amount of cash, accounting on average for
11% of firms’ total assets (median of 4%). In line with earlier findings (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz,
and Williamson, 1999), our model suggests that the principal motive for these cash holdings is
to provision for liquidity needs arising due to expenditure shocks associated with the advanced
technology, that is, with more productive but risky investment.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Observations mean s.d. min max
Compustat and WDI:
R&D/assets 125,709 .261 8.59 0 1
Corp. liquidity/assets 320,325 .113 .179 0 1
Inv/assets 357,136 .641 .230 0 1
ln(corp. liquidity) 326,943 2.22 2.05 -6.91 13.0
ln(total assets) 382,007 4.77 2.55 0 15.1
ln(retained earnings) 237,585 3.54 2.46 -6.91 12.9
inflation 428,482 3.64% 2.53 -.36% 13.5%
ln(real GDP pc) 428,482 6.38 .231 6.16 6.99
22Our Compustat results are also better comparable to those from the empirical corporate finance literature
discussed in the Introduction.
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For the Compustat sample we consider a slightly different empirical specification due to the
different nature of the data,
yjst = β0 + β1inflt + β2Xjst + β3Xt + Ij + jst, (15)
where yjst denotes either R&D expenses over total assets or cash holdings over total assets for
firm j in sector s, and year t. Xjst is the matrix of firm-level control variables, Xt the vector
of macro-level control variables, Ij is a vector of firm fixed effects, and jst an independent and
identically distributed error. The main coefficient of interest (β1) measures to what extent a
firm in the U.S. adjusts its R&D activity in periods of higher inflation, after controlling for
all fixed firm attributes, for changes in the firm-specific control variables, and for changes in
aggregate economic activity. We also report the results from the analogous specification to (15)
where we control for industry instead of firm fixed effects. In that case, β1 measures whether
establishments operating in the same two-digit industry are, on average, less likely to innovate
when inflation rises.
The results, reported in Table 6, show that U.S. firms indeed hold more cash when they
invest in R&D.23 A 1% increase in corporate cash holdings is associated with an increase of
1.5 pp in firms’ share of R&D in total assets (column 1), corresponding to an average increase
in firms’ R&D intensity by 6%. The positive correlation between corporate cash holdings and
R&D investment is significant across firms operating in the same two-digit sector (column 1)
and within firms over time (column 2). The results in columns 3 and 4 further confirm that
inflation raises the (opportunity) cost facing firms holding such liquidity. A 1 pp increase in
inflation reduces firms’ liquidity holdings by 5.5% (liquidity is reduced by 0.6 pp relative to an
average across firms of 11%). Moreover, the results are robust if we restrict the sample to firms
that actually report positive R&D investment (column 5). Taken together, columns 1 to 5 of
Table 6 confirm our earlier findings from the WBES sample and thus further corroborate the
theoretical model’s central predictions.
In analogy to the WBES results for developing countries, we find that U.S. firms reduce their
23Our finding is consistent with Opler et al. (1999) who show that U.S. firms with higher growth opportunities,
approximated by their market-to-book value and R&D expenses, hold on average more liquid assets (cash and
marketable securities) relative to total assets.
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Table 6: U.S. long firm-level panel data 1960-2016:
Firms adjust liquidity holdings and reduce R&D investment in periods of higher inflation
1960-2008
R&D/assets Corp. liquidity/assets R&D/assets inv/assets R&D/assets
inflation -.006∗∗ -.003∗∗ -.003∗∗ -.003∗∗ -.001∗∗ -.001∗ -.001∗∗
(-5.97) (-5.05) (-3.75) (-3.17) (-3.87) (-1.77) (-4.86)
ln(Corporate liquidity) .015∗∗ .001∗∗
(6.39) (2.84)
ln(total assets) -.027∗∗ -.017∗∗ -.018∗∗ -.015∗∗ -.003 -.016∗∗ -.016∗∗ -.012∗∗ -.015∗∗
(-4.31) (-10.4) (-11.6) (-7.97) (-1.22) (-3.62) (-9.20) (-5.01) (-9.74)
ln(retained earnings) .004∗ .005∗∗ .008∗∗ .006∗∗ .005∗∗ .005∗∗ .005∗∗ .022∗∗ .004∗∗
(1.92) (3.59) (8.87) (12.7) (5.64) (2.24) (3.92) (16.8) (4.79)
ln(real GDP pc) -.069∗∗ -.046∗∗ -.064∗∗ -.029∗∗ -.034∗∗ -.062∗∗ -.039∗∗ .143∗∗ -.040∗∗
(-4.02) (-9.48) (-5.50) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-4.60) (-9.46) (10.9) (-9.65)
Firm FE No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes No Yes No No Yes No No No
Obs 62,104 62,104 202,285 202,285 61,691 68,500 68,500 234,610 59,893
U.S. firm-level balance sheet panel data from Compustat, 1950-2016. Median inflation: 3.0% (average 2.6%).
Heteroscedasticity robust s.e. clustered at year level; t-statistics in parenthesis. **,* significant at 5%, 10%.
investment in advanced but risky technologies (as measured by their R&D share) in periods of
higher inflation (columns 6-7 of Table 6). The result is robust to variations in sample periods,
for instance, when excluding the years after the global financial crisis (column 9). As before,
we do not find an equivalent impact of inflation on firms’ total investment (column 8).24
Finally, the data for U.S. firms also support the theoretical model’s sector-specific predictions
in the generalized difference-in-difference estimation. Table 7 presents the results. We find that
the negative impact of inflation on U.S. firms’ R&D investment is larger in more volatile sectors,
in sectors with higher value added growth, and in more R&D intensive sectors.25
24The coefficient is marginally significant at the 10% level. However, we find a significant negative impact of
inflation on the ratio of R&D over total investment (not reported in Table 6), consistent with the notion that
inflation has a stronger impact on R&D than on non-R&D investment.
25We do not test the model prediction for sectors with higher asset tangibility since we expect that firms
in the U.S. can also leverage their intangible assets (e.g., their brand name) as collateral. We thus predict a
meaningful correlation between firms’ access to external finance and their ability to provide collateral exclusively
through non-intangible assets only for firms in financially less developed countries. In fact, we find that, in the
U.S., R&D intensive two-digit sectors have a lower asset tangibility.
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Table 7: U.S. long firm-level panel data 1960-2016:
Sector-specific identification of inflation effects on R&D
R&D/assets
sector volatility sector growth sector R&D intensity
inflation ∗ sector-volatility -.001∗∗
(-2.67)
inflation ∗ sector-growth -.002∗∗
(-2.86)
inflation ∗ sector-R&D -.001∗∗
(-5.38)
ln(total assets) -.016∗∗ -.016∗∗ -.016∗∗
(-9.79) (-9.79) (-9.85)
ln(retained earnings) .004∗∗ .004∗∗ .004∗∗
(3.38) (3.37) (3.36)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 37,949 37,949 37,949
U.S. firm-level balance sheet panel data from Compustat, 1950-2016.
Median inflation: 3.0% (average 2.6%). Heteroscedasticity robust s.e.
clustered at year level t-statistics in parenthesis. **,* significant at 5%, 10%.
5 Conclusion
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature concerned with the effects of inflation on
innovation, productivity and growth. We first present a simple model proposing a negative
causal effect of inflation on growth, which is transmitted not via aggregate investment, but
instead via technology choice. Hence, inflation affects the composition of investment, tilting it
away from innovative activities towards safer but return-dominated ones. The primary channel
along which adverse effects of inflation materialize is therefore not in the volume of aggregate
investment, but in the dynamics of aggregate productivity growth.
Our theory is based on the idea of costly liquidity provision in the presence of financial
frictions and makes predictions about how the severity of the adverse inflation effect depends
on firm (or industry) characteristics. Specifically, we show that the liquidity mechanism is
particularly relevant in fast growing and volatile industries, and in those with high income
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pledgeability. The demand for liquidity and the composition of investment in these industries
are therefore predicted to be more sensitive to variations in the rate of inflation.
Second, we test these predictions with firm-level data. We use novel data from the WBES
to overcome the small sample problems typically encountered in empirical models that aim
to examine the consequences of aggregate macroeconomic conditions (inflation) for individual
microeconomic units (firms). For the harmonized panel covering firms in 139 developing coun-
tries, we find that inflation shifts the composition but not the overall quantity of investment.
The impact of inflation on firms’ technology choice is statistically and economically significant:
a 1 pp increase in a given developing country’s rate of inflation reduces the probability that
establishments in that country engage in product or process innovation by 4.3%. Inflation
also reduces the share of working capital financed by internal funds/retained earnings. And
the adverse effects of inflation increase with establishments’ dependence on retained earnings
to finance their working capital, consistent with the view that innovation activities are hard
to finance externally. Finally, exploiting variation in industry characteristics, our generalized
difference-in-difference estimations validate the sector-specific predictions of our theoretical
model.
In a further robustness exercise, we consider balance sheet data for U.S. firms which provide
direct information about firms’ liquidity holdings. We find that corporate liquidity (cash)
holdings are increasing with firms’ R&D investment but that inflation reduces their liquidity
holdings. Our findings thus corroborate the key components of the transmission mechanism
proposed in our theoretical model also in the context of an advanced economy with developed
financial markets.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The claimed effects follow immediately from comparative statics of expression (11).
Part (i):
∂Eyjadvanced
∂(1+R)
= (1− γ) ρ¯[1−γωlAj ]
[(1+R)−γρ¯]2 < 0, where the sign follows because γωlA
j > 1.
Part (ii):
∂2Eyjadvanced
∂(1+R)∂ωlAj
= (1− γ) −γρ¯
[(1+R)−γρ¯]2 < 0.
Part (iii):
∂2Eyjadvanced
∂(1+R)∂ρ¯
= (1 − γ) [1−γωlAj ][(1+R)+γρ¯]
[(1+R)−γρ¯]3 < 0, where the sign follows because
γωlA
j > 1.
Part (iv):
∂Eyjadvanced
∂γ
= Eyjadvanced
[
ρ¯−(1+R)
(1−γ)[(1+R)−γρ¯]
]
> 0 and
∂2Eyjadvanced
∂γ∂(1+R)
=
∂Eyjadvanced
∂(1+R)
[
ρ¯−(1+R)
(1−γ)[(1+R)−γρ¯]
]
− Eyjadvanced (1−γ)
2ρ¯
[(1−γ)[(1+R)−γρ¯]]2 < 0, where the sign
follows because ρ¯ > (1 +R).
To clarify the transmission mechanism, it is also useful to consider the following comparative
statics of expression (10).
Part (i): ∂l
j
∂(1+R)
= γρ¯[1−γωlA
j ]
[(1+R)−γρ¯]2 < 0, where the sign follows because γωlA
j > 1.
Part (ii): ∂
2lj
∂(1+R)∂ωlAj
= −γ
2ρ¯
[(1+R)−γρ¯]2 < 0.
Part (iii): ∂
2lj
∂(1+R)∂ρ¯
= γ[1−γωlA
j ][(1+R)+γρ¯]
[(1+R)−γρ¯]3 < 0, where the sign follows because γωlA
j > 1.
Part (iv): ∂
2lj
∂(1+R)∂γ
= ρ¯[1−γωlA
j ][(1+R)+γρ¯]
[(1+R)−γρ¯]3 < 0, where the sign follows because γωlA
j > 1.
A.2 Variable investment scale
The model can be generalized to allow for variable investment scale at date 0. Given the linear
specification of technology, the analysis then proceeds per unit of initial investment. In detail,
suppose both basic and advanced projects can be adopted in variable scale. Entrepreneur j
then has the choice between the basic project at scale kj and the advanced project at initial
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scale ij0. The relevant condition Ey
j
advanced ≥ yjbasic governing technology choice then reads
(1− γ)(1 +R)ωlA
j − ρ¯
(1 +R)− γρ¯ i
j
0 ≥ (B − 1)kj.
Since the borrowing constraint facing advanced projects applies jointly for initial investment and
liquid assets, there results a trade-off between the initial investment scale ij0 and the scope for
insurance against expenditure shocks via lj; see the expressions below. Hence, ij0 is naturally
bounded. For basic projects, however, there is no such mechanism. Given the assumption
γB > 1, the borrowing constraint for the basic technology is not binding, so the choice of kj is
unconstrained. Given the linear specification, income from the basic technology then becomes
unbounded along with the choice of kj. An economically meaningful choice between the basic
and the advanced technology is therefore possible only in terms of expected income per unit of
initial investment. Under this caveat, the condition for technology choice is the same as under
unitary project scale,
Aj ≥ 1
ωl
(B−1)
(1−γ) [(1 +R)− γρ¯]k
j
ij0
+ ρ¯
(1 +R)
.
To see this, consider an advanced project with variable initial investment scale ij0. Its state-
contingent returns are
yjl = A
jij0 +
lj
(1 +R)
,
yju = ρ
lj
(1 +R)
.
The date 0 budget constraint is
ij0 + l
j = dj,
the (binding) borrowing constraint is
dj = γ
(
ωlA
jij0 + ρ¯
lj
(1 +R)
)
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and the demand for liquidity is
lj =
(1 +R)(γωlA
j − 1)
(1 +R)− γρ¯ i
j
0,
or, expressed relative to the scale of initial investment,
lj
ij0
=
(1 +R)(γωlA
j − 1)
(1 +R)− γρ¯ .
The expected income per unit of initial investment is then given by
Eyjadvanced
ij0
= (1− γ)(1 +R)ωlA
j − ρ¯
(1 +R)− γρ¯ .
The last two expressions are identical to their counterparts under unitary investment scale
presented in the main text. The same is obviously true for their comparative statics,
∂(lj/ij0)
∂(1 +R)
=
γρ¯[1− γωlAj]
[(1 +R)− γρ¯]2 < 0,
∂2(lj/ij0)
∂(1 +R)∂ωlAj
=
γρ¯[1− γωlAj]
[(1 +R)− γρ¯]2 < 0,
∂2(lj/ij0)
∂(1 +R)∂ρ¯
=
γ[1− γωlAj][(1 +R) + γρ¯]
[(1 +R)− γρ¯]3 < 0,
∂2(lj/ij0)
∂(1 +R)∂γ
=
ρ¯[1− γωlAj][(1 +R) + γρ¯]
[(1 +R)− γρ¯]3 < 0,
and
∂(Eyjadvanced/i
j
0)
∂(1 +R)
= (1− γ) ρ¯[1− γωlA
j]
[(1 +R)− γρ¯]2 < 0,
∂2(Eyjadvanced/i
j
0)
∂(1 +R)∂ωlAj
= (1− γ) −γρ¯
[(1 +R)− γρ¯]2 < 0,
∂2(Eyjadvanced/i
j
0)
∂(1 +R)∂ρ¯
= (1− γ) [1− γωlA
j][(1 +R) + γρ¯]
[(1 +R)− γρ¯]3 < 0,
∂2(Eyjadvanced/i
j
0)
∂(1 +R)∂γ
=
∂Eyjadvanced
∂(1 +R)
[
ρ¯− (1 +R)
(1− γ)[(1 +R)− γρ¯]
]
− Eyjadvanced
(1− γ)2ρ¯
[(1− γ)[(1 +R)− γρ¯]]2 < 0.
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In sum, both the condition for technology choice and the underlying comparative static effects
remain unchanged, provided they are considered per unit of initial investment.
A.3 World Bank Enterprise Surveys data description
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) are designed to generate internationally compara-
ble establishment-level panel data. They include information on establishments’ characteristics,
innovation activities, sources of finance, and key balance sheet items for 139 developing coun-
tries. The surveys are harmonized across countries and are conducted about every three years
in each country. They include over 100,000 firms in developing countries between 2006 and
2016. The surveys provide sampling weights for each country-year episode and are representa-
tive for the formal private sector economy (that is, for firms with at least five employees). The
weighted estimations are thus representative for the formal private sector at the country-year
level.
The sampling considers the following industries (ISIC codes): all manufacturing sectors
(group D), construction (group F), services (groups G and H), and transport, storage, and
communications (group I). In particular, the sample size ensures a minimum precision of 7.5%
for the 90% confidence interval about estimates of (i) the population proportion and (ii) the
mean of log sales of these industries. A second level of stratification is firm size defined as
small (5-19 employees), medium (20-99 employees), and large (100 or more employees). The
targeted firms are establishments with at least five full-time employees with a minimum of eight
working hours (or a complete work shift) per day. The restriction in firm size is supposed to
limit the surveys to the formal economy; firms that are un-registered with the registrar/tax
authority are thus excluded. An establishment is defined as a single physical business location
and may be part of a firm. However, establishments are required to make their own financial
decisions, have their own managerial oversight, and have books separated from the parent firm.
Moreover, targeted establishments are located in major metropolitan areas of a country. The
sampling methodology is the same in all countries.
The questionnaire is designed to be administered in face-to-face interviews with owners,
managing directors, accountants, or other relevant staff. The interviewers as well as all other
staff involved in the survey are thoroughly trained, whereas the World Bank experts supervise
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the training. The interviewers have to pass an exam in the end of the training in order to qualify
for the work. The World Bank assures the strict confidentiality of the survey information. Any
missing data or inconsistencies are checked by the interviewer and a field supervisor immediately
after the interview and after the filing of the data.
Neither the name of the respondent nor the name of the firm is used in any document based
on the survey. The high degree of confidentiality is necessary to avoid biased declarations of
respondents, who are informed of these conditions at the outset of the interview. Moreover,
the World Bank ensures a wide publicity of the launch of the survey, e.g., via newspaper adver-
tisements, and contacts local agencies to gain the support of the local business communities.
This creates a value of potential reform recommendations resulting from the survey and thereby
improves a firm’s incentives to respond to the questionnaire. Pilot surveys and field experience
suggest that the completion of the core Enterprise Surveys lasts approximately 45 minutes.
This limitation in the length also contributes to the quality of the responses. In spite of these
carefully designed survey characteristics, non-responses could compromise the random nature
of the sample if the rationales for non-responses vary systematically with the respondents’
innovation activity. The WBES thus conduct additional field-work reports that examine the
reasons for non-responds in each country, industry, and class of firm size.
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